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Wepresent a formal development in Event-B of a distributed topology discovery algorithm.
Distributed topology discovery is at the core of several routing algorithms and is the
problem of each node in a network discovering and maintaining information on the
network topology. One of the key challenges in developing this algorithm is specifying
the problem itself. We provide a specification that includes both safety properties,
formalizing invariants that should hold in all system states, and liveness properties
that characterize when the system reaches stable states. We prove these properties by
appropriately combining proofs of invariants, event refinement, event convergence, and
deadlock freedom. The combination of these features is novel and should be useful for
formalizing and developing other kinds of semi-reactive systems, which are systems that
react to, but donotmodify, their environment. Our entire development has been formalized
and machine checked using the Rodin tool.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We report here on a case study in critical system development using refinement. In our case study, we use the Event-B
formalism [2] to specify and formally develop an algorithm for topology discovery, which is a problem arising in network
routing. We proceed by constructing a series of models, where the initial models specify the system requirements and the
final model describes the resulting system.We use the Rodin tool for Event-B [3] to prove that each successivemodel refines
the previous one, whereby the resulting system is correct by construction.
The problem that we examine is interesting for several reasons. First, it is a significant case study in specifying and
developing distributed graph and routing algorithms. In routing protocols such as link-state routing [26], which is the basis
for protocols such as OSPF [22,21] and OLSR [24], every router in the network must build a graph representing the network
topology. In this graph (also called a link-state database), the vertices represent routing nodes and there is an edge fromnode
a to node b if a can directly transmit data to b. Each node uses this graph to determine the shortest path to all other nodes,
from which it constructs its routing table, which describes the best next hop to each destination. The main challenge in
topology discovery is to ensure that the distributed construction of these graphs, as well as their updates after network
changes, proceeds correctly. Roughly speaking, this means that whenever a source node sends a packet to a reachable
destination, and the packet is forwarded hop by hop using the local routing tables, then the packet actually reaches its
destination. While there has been some work on using model checkers and theorem provers to verify properties of routing
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protocols (see Section 5.1 for discussion of relatedwork), there have been relatively few case studies in using formalmethods
to develop such protocols. Our work provides some insights on how this can be done.
Second, as we will see, formally developing a topology discovery protocol is surprisingly nontrivial. The complexity is
both in specifying the protocol’s desired properties and in carrying out the development and proofs. This complexity comes
from the fact that the protocol should function in dynamically changing environments. If we do not place constraints on the
environment a priori (which we do not) then the actual topology may change faster than nodes can propagate information
about the changes that they discover. For example, two nodes may be connected and not know it, but by the time they
receive link information on their status, they may no longer be connected. In other words, their link-state databases may
never converge to an accurate view of the actual network topology.
To address this problem, we present a novel approach to specifying and developing algorithmswhose properties depend
on the environment’s dynamics. In particular, we specify the system’s properties in stable system states (cf. Section 4.3).
These are, roughly speaking, states where all nodes havemaximum knowledge about the environment.We prove that when
certain events are convergent (which means they cannot take control of the system for ever; cf. Section 2.2) and deadlock
free, then stable states are reached and that this suffices for the correctness of the nodes’ link-state databases.
Finally, our case study is representative of an important class of systems, whichwe call (distributed) semi-reactive systems.
These are distributed systems where the environment is dynamically changing and although the system cannot alter
the environment it must monitor and appropriately react to the changes in the environment. This includes, for example,
distributedmonitoring algorithmswhere the nodesmust reach some kind of agreement about the environment’s properties.
Our approach suggests one way of developing systems in this general class.
Organization. In Section 2, we introduce Event-B and the Rodin tool. Afterwards, in Section 3, we describe topology
discovery, within the context of link-state routing. In Section 4, we present our formal development as well as the general
development strategy behind it. Finally, in Section 5, we review related work and draw conclusions.
2. Background on Event-B
Event-B is a formalism for formalizing and developing systems whose components can bemodeled as discrete transition
systems. It represents a further evolution of the B-method [1], which has been simplified and is now centered around the
general notion of events, also found in Action Systems [6] and TLA [17]. We provide a brief overview here of Event-B. Full
details are provided in [2].
A development in Event-B [5] is a set of formalmodels. Themodels are built fromexpressions in amathematical language,
which are stored in a repository. When presenting our models, we will do so in a pretty-printed form, e.g., adding keywords
and following layout conventions to aid parsing. Event-B has a semantics based on transition systems and simulation
between such systems, described in [2]. We will not describe in detail the semantics here and instead just describe some of
the proof obligations that are important for our development.
Event-Bmodels are organized in terms of the two basic constructs: contexts andmachines. Contexts specify the static part
of a model whereas machines specify the dynamic part. Contexts may contain carrier sets, constants, axioms, and theorems.
Carrier sets are similar to types [5]. Axioms constrain carrier sets and constants, whereas theorems express properties
derivable from axioms. The role of a context is to isolate the parameters of a formal model (carrier sets and constants)
and their properties, which are intended to hold for all instances.
2.1. Machines
Machines specify behavioral properties of Event-B models. Machines may contain variables, invariants, theorems, events,
and variants. Variables v define the state of a machine. They are constrained by invariants I(v). Possible state changes are
described by events.
Events. Each event is composed of a guard G(t, v) (the conjunction of one or more predicates) and an action S(t, v), where
the t are the event’s parameters.1 The guard states the necessary condition under which an event may occur, and the action
describes how the state variables evolve when the event occurs. An event can be represented by the term
any t where G(t, v) then S(t, v) end (1)
We use the short form
when G(v) then S(v) end (2)
when the event does not have any parameters, and we write
begin S(v) end (3)
1 When referring to variables v and parameters t , we usually allow for multiple variables and parameters, i.e., they may be ‘‘vectors’’. When we later
write expressions like x := E(t, v)wemean that if x contains n > 0 variables, then E must also be a vector of expressions, one for each of the n variables.
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when, in addition, the event’s guard equals true. A dedicated event of the form (3) is used for initialization. Note that events
may be annotated to indicate whether they refine other events and with their convergence status. We will say more about
this annotation later.
The action of an event is composed of one or more assignments of the form
x := E(t, v) (4)
x :∈ E(t, v) (5)
x :| Q (t, v, x′) , (6)
where x are some of the variables contained in v, E(t, v) is an expression, and Q (t, v, x′) is a predicate. In (4) and (5), x
must be a single variable. Assignments of the form (4) are deterministic, whereas the other two forms are nondeterministic.
In (5), x is assigned an element of a set. In (6), Q is a before–after predicate, which relates the values x (before the action)
and x′ (afterwards). (6) is the most general form of assignment and nondeterministically selects an after-state x′ satisfying
Q and assigns it to x. There is also a side condition on the action of an event: the variables on the left-hand side of the
assignments contained in the action must be disjoint. Note that the before–after predicates for (4) and (5) are as expected;
namely, x′ = E(t, v) and x′ ∈ E(t, v), respectively.
All assignments of an action S(v) occur simultaneously, which is expressed by conjoining together their before–after
predicates. Assume that x is the set of variables that are modified by some assignments (i.e., the variables appearing on any
assignment’s left-hand side) and the y are the unmodified variables (i.e., y = v \ x); the before–after predicate of the action
S(v) is expressed by conjoining all before–after predicates associated with each assignment and y = y′ (since the y are
unchanged). We denoted this predicate as S(v, v′).
Semantics. An Event-B model formalizes a state transition system. Each state corresponds to the values of the variables v
that satisfy the invariants I(v), i.e., the state space is the set {v | I(v)}. The system’s transitions correspond to the events
of the Event-B model, where each event represents an atomic step that describes a system transition. Each event therefore
defines a relation R(v, v′) between the pre-state v before the event and the post-state v′ after the event. In particular, each v
in R’s domain satisfies the guard G(v) and each v′ in the R’s range satisfies the before–after predicate S(v, v′) given by the
action. In other words, R(v, v′) = G(v)∧S(v, v′). Wewill later also refer to the pairs (v, v′) in the relation as instances of the
event. A model’s transition relation is therefore the union of the transition relations associated with each of the events. The
resulting transition systemmay be nondeterministic either because an event involves a nondeterministic action or because
multiple events have overlapping guards.
Obligations. Event-B defines proof obligations, whichmust be proven to show that machines have their specified properties.
We describe below the proof obligation for invariant preservation. Formal definitions of all proof obligations are given in [2].
Invariant preservation states that invariants aremaintainedwhenever variables change their values. Obviously, this does not
hold a priori for any combination of events and invariants and thereforemust be proved. For each event, wemust prove that
the invariants I are re-established after the event is carried out. More precisely, under the assumption of the invariants I and
the event’s guard G, we must prove that the invariants still hold in any possible state after the event’s execution given by
the before–after predicate S(t, v, v′). The proof obligation is as follows.
I(v),G(v), S(t, v, v′) ` I(v′) (INV)
Similar proof obligations are associated with a machine’s initialization event. The only difference is that there is no
assumption that the invariants hold. For brevity, we do not treat initialization differently from ordinary machine events.
The required modifications of the associated proof obligations are straightforward. Note that in practice, by the property of
conjunctivity, we can prove the preservation of each invariant separately.
2.2. Machine refinement
Machine refinement provides ameans for introducing details about the dynamic properties of amodel [5]. Formore details
on the theory of refinement, we refer the reader to the Action System formalism [6], which has inspired the development
of Event-B. Here we sketch some central proof obligations for machine refinement.
A machine CM can refine another machine AM . We call AM the abstract machine and CM the concrete machine. The
states of the abstract machine are related to the states of the concrete machine by gluing invariants J(v,w), where v are the
variables of the abstract machine and w are the variables of the concrete machine. Note that the gluing invariants J(v,w)
include both the local invariants of the concrete model CM (which refers only tow) and the simulation relation that should
hold between the concrete and abstract domains (which refers to both v andw).
Each event ea of the abstract machine is refined by one or more concrete events ec. Let the abstract event ea and concrete
event ec be as follows.
ea =̂ any t where G(t, v) then S(t, v) end (7)
ec =̂ any uwhere H(u, w) then T (u, w) end (8)
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Somewhat simplifying, we can say that ec refines ea if the guard of ec is stronger than the guard of ea (guard strengthening),
and the gluing invariants J(v,w) establish a simulation of ec by ea (simulation). Intuitively, the above conditions guarantee
that any trace (sequence of states) of the concrete system can be simulated by the abstract systemwith respect to the gluing
invariants J(v,w). Proving guard strengthening just amounts to proving an implication. For simulation, we must prove that
ec can be simulated by ea. More precisely, under the assumption of the invariants I and J and the concrete guard H , and
given the transition described by T, we must show that it is possible to choose a value for the abstract parameter t and a
value for the abstract after variable v′ such that the abstract guard G holds, the abstract before–after predicate S holds, and
the gluing invariants J are re-established (this includes both the maintenance of the local invariants and preservation of the
simulation relation). The proof obligation is as follows.
I(v), J(v,w),H(u, w), T(u, w,w′) ` ∃t, v′ ·G(t) ∧ S(t, v, v′) ∧ J(v′, w′)
In order to prove the above obligation, the abstract parameter t and after variable v′ need to be instantiated. The instan-
tiations are given in the model as witnesses for t and v′ associated with the concrete events. The witnesses are indicated
using the keywordwith and are given by predicatesW1(t, u, w) for t andW2(v′, u, w) for v′. Given the witnesses, this proof
obligation can be split into the following three proof obligations.
I(v), J(v,w),H(u, w),W1(t, u, w) ` G(t) (GRD)
I(v), J(v,w),H(u, w), T(u, w,w′),W1(t, u, w),W2(v′, u, w) ` S(t, v, v′) (SIM)
I(v), J(v,w),H(u, w), T(u, w,w′),W2(v′, u, w) ` J(v′, w′) (INV_REF)
Note that in practice, we only need to give witnesses for parameters of the abstract event t that does not appear in the
concrete events, and the abstract after variables v′ when the abstract action modifying these variables is nondeterministic,
i.e. of the form (5) or (6). In the other cases, the witnesses can be derived.
A special case of refinement (called superposition refinement) is when v is kept in the refinement, i.e. v ⊆ w. This is the
same as renaming the abstract variables v to v0 and adding to v0 = v to the gluing invariants J . In particular, if the actions
are deterministic for both abstract and concrete events, the simulation proof obligation SIM and invariant refinement proof
obligation INV_REF hold if and only if the expressions assigned to v0 and v are equivalent. Our reasoning in the later sections
will often use this fact.
In the course of refinement, new events are often introduced into a model. New events must be proved to refine the
implicit abstract event skip, which does nothing. Moreover, it may be proved that the new events do not collectively diverge.
In other words, the new events cannot take control forever and hence one of the old events eventually occurs. To prove this,
one gives a variant V , which maps a state w to a finite set. One then proves that each new event strictly decreases V . More
precisely, let ev be a new event, wherew is the state before executing ev andw′ is the state after. Then for each such ev,w,
and w′, one proves that V (w′) ( V (w), under the additional assumptions of all invariants and of the guard of ev. Since the
variant maps a state to a finite set, V induces a well-founded ordering on system states given by strict subset-inclusion of
their images under V .
As explained above, we assume that the variant is a set expression. It can be more elaborate [5], but this is not relevant
here. We call the new events that satisfy the above property convergent. Note that in some cases the convergence of some
events cannot be immediately shown, but only in a later refinement. In this case, their convergence is anticipated and we
must prove that V (w′) ⊆ V (w), that is, these anticipated events do not enlarge the variant. The convergent attribute of an
event is denoted by the keyword status with three possible values: convergent, anticipated, and ordinary (for events which
are not convergent). Events are ordinary by default.
We have used the Rodin tool [3] for our formal development. This is an industrial-strength tool for creating and analyzing
Event-B models. It includes a proof-obligation generator and support for interactive and semi-automated theorem proving.
3. Topology discovery
In this section, we describe our requirements on the system and our assumptions on the environment for topology
discovery. We begin by describing the problem and algorithm informally, in the context of link-state routing, which is one
of its main applications.
3.1. Informal description
Routing is the process of selecting paths through a network for sending data from a source to a destination. A path may
require the data to travel over multiple hops, each hop being an intermediate router. At each router, data is forwarded
using routing tables to select the next hop (the appropriate output port) on the basis of the packet’s destination address. It
is the routing algorithm’s task to build these routing tables. In link-state routing, this is done using several auxiliary data
structures. In particular, each router maintains a link-state database (LSDB) that encodes its view of the topology of the
communication network, i.e., the set of routers and the links between them. From its LSDB, a router computes a shortest
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Fig. 1. Link-state algorithm for node n (loop body).
path first (SPF) tree, using Dijkstra’s algorithm [13]. The SPF tree is used to create the routing table: the next hop to some
destination is simply the neighbor that constitutes the first link in the shortest path to that destination. Examples of routing
algorithms that proceed this way include the Open Shortest Path First protocol (OSPF) [21,22] and (optimized) link-state
routing [10,11].
Expressed graph theoretically, each router corresponds to a node in the graph and there is an edge from nodem to node
n if mmay directly (without the help of intermediate nodes) transmit data to n, i.e., m and n are communication neighbors.
Note that this relationship is often symmetric, so the underlying graph is undirected. But it need not always be so, i.e., edges
(representing links) may exist in only one direction, whereby the receiver cannot directly returnmessages to the sender [8].
The edges may also be weighted, where the weight may represent the physical distance between the connected nodes, or
combine other relevant metrics (such as capacity, mean queuing and transmission delay, etc.). Finding optimal paths can
then be reduced to computing shortest paths through the resulting graph.
In our case study, we will focus on the important subproblem of topology discovery: discovering and maintaining local
information about the network topology. This requires a distributed algorithm (protocol) since each nodemust construct its
own local copy of the network topology. This is done by having each node discover changes in its own local communication
environment and communicating this information to other nodes. The nodes each individually build their own graphs,
representing their local view of the global network topology.
To show how topology discovery is used within the context of routing, Fig. 1 presents a simplified view of the main
functionality of link-state routing. The algorithm consists of an infinite loop that runs on each node n. The loop’s body
nondeterministically chooses (represented by ) between three parts. From left to right, these parts are:
1. Detect and propagate changes.
2. Receive and process changes.
3. Send information to neighboring nodes.
The first part describes how a node detects, processes, and propagates changes. Suppose a node n detects a change in
the status of a link that joins some node m to n. The node n then adjusts its own link-state database (LSDB), which stores
all topology graph nodes and edges. Afterwards, it updates its shortest path first (SPF) tree from the LSDB using Dijkstra’s
algorithm. Finally, it creates a link-state advertisement (LSA) describing the status (up or down) of the link from m to n,
and starts flooding the network by broadcasting this to all of its neighbors. The second part describes a node’s actions after
receiving a link-state advertisement. If the LSA is fresh (i.e., not previously received), then again the SPF tree is updated and
the flooding is continued by sending the LSA to all neighbors. The third part states that a node n can, at any time, start flooding
the network by broadcasting information about its current link-state database. This can be implemented by n broadcasting
an LSA describing the status of the link from x to y, for each pair of distinct nodes x and y. Alternatively, one message can be
broadcast, describing the entire state of n’s LSDB. In this case, the second part must be modified to also handle the reception
of LSDBs.
These three parts implement basic link-state routing. If we are interested in pure topology discovery, it suffices to simply
delete the two UpdateSPFTree statements. The resulting algorithm corresponds closely to what wewill develop in Section 4.
A key point is the need for the third part of the algorithm, which broadcasts the LSDB, thereby initiating flooding even
when no changes are present. This is required for two reasons:
1. to handle the possibility that LSAs are lost during communication and
2. to handle the special case where disconnected parts of a network are reconnected.
(1) can occur if a link goes down during message transit. Fig. 2 illustrates (2). Suppose that the network is disconnected
into two subnetworks S1 and S2, which each undergo changes and at some later time become connected due to a link l
coming up. Just flooding both subnetworks with an LSA describing l being up is not enough for the nodes in S1 to learn
the topology of S2 and vice versa. In actual link-state routing protocols, this third part, periodic flooding, occurs at fixed,
relatively infrequent intervals. For example, in OSPF it takes place every 30 min.
Observe that the above algorithm description is an abstract sketch in that it omits critical details. For example, nodes
receive and propagate information at different times and hence a node may receive old LSAs containing invalid information
about the network topology. How such details are handled (using time stamps, sequence numbers, or age fields) and the
updating is performed is not specified in the above. We must address precisely such details in our case study.
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Fig. 2. Link l comes up and joins two independent subnetworks.
3.2. Requirements for topology discovery
As previously mentioned, it is surprisingly difficult to formulate the requirements for topology discovery. The protocol
must operate in an environment where the status of links may change at any time. Moreover, the environment’s behavior is
out of the control of the protocol and not influenced by it (this is the notion of semi-reactive system, previously mentioned
at the end of Section 1). If the environment changes sufficiently rapidly, then links reported as downmay actually be up and
vice versa. Hence the local LSDBs may bear little relationship to the actual network topology.
There is no clear agreement in the literature about the properties that the protocol should have. One property sometimes
mentioned is consistency, which is formulated in terms of actual routing decisions. Consistency states that the topology
information stored by each node is such that the local routing tables that they generate lead to a loop-free path between
any desired (source, destination) pair in the system. Hence data sent will not enter loops or get lost. One drawback of this
specification is that it is not a property of the local states, but rather a systemwide property of routing itself. A second, more
serious problem is that this property, in general, will not always hold since the local view of nodes (their LSDBs) will not
always reflect the actual network topology. Hence this property is too strong: in practice, the system will often be in an
inconsistent state.
We see two options forweakening consistency to something that can hold. The first option is the one usually taken by the
network community and entails the use of simulation. Namely, one simulates the network under different environments and
measures the rate of data throughput. The idea here is that if the environment changes slowly with respect to the system,
then we expect that routing should be possible, even if not completely reliably (reliability can be handled by transport layer
protocols like TCP). Simulation can be used to make statements about the network’s performance, for example, throughput
and delay, as a function of the environment’s dynamics. It therefore also enables a quantitative comparison of protocols.
A second option, which is the one that we shall pursue, is to focus on the limiting case: the behavior of the algorithm
when the environment is sufficiently quiescent. In this case, we expect that the local LSDBs will eventually converge (also
called ‘‘stabilizing’’ in the routing literature) to images of the actual global topology. Some care must be taken in precisely
formalizing this, in particular to handle the previously mentioned problem that the network may not always be connected.
In general, a node n can only learn about a link from a node k to its neighbor m when there is a path through the graph
(representing the topology) fromm to n.
Following this second option, we formulate our main requirement. Recall from basic graph theory that any graph can be
decomposed into a collection of (maximal) strongly connected components. Our main system requirement is then:
System Requirement 1. If the environment is inactive for a sufficiently long time then for each strongly connected
componentM , the local view (LSDB) of every node inM is in agreement with the actual topology, restricted toM .
Hence, when information about the system gained from link sensing (detecting communication neighbors) and
communication stabilizes, each node has the correct view of the links between all nodes in its connected subnetwork.
We state one further requirement, which limits the possible local views of nodes during the protocol.
System Requirement 2. The local views of the nodes must be consistent with the past: a link listed as up is either up or
was previously up and a link is listed as down is either down or was previously down.
This requirement rules out the case where a node concludes that a link is up that never was. So errors in the local topologies
must effectively come from communication delays concerning status changes.
3.3. Environment assumptions
Before developing a topology discovery algorithm, wemust also be clear about our assumptions on the environment.We
list them below.
Environment Assumption 1. There are only finitely many nodes.
Without this assumption, any notion of stability based on a hop-by-hop propagation of information would be unachievable.
Environment Assumption 2. There are directed, one-way links between some pairs of distinct nodes. Links may come up
or go down at any time.
These links represent the ability to carry out directed (one-way) communication between two nodes.
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Environment Assumption 3. When there is a new link from node m to node n, then n is made aware of this. Likewise,
when a link fromm to n exists and is broken, n is also made aware of this.
We will refer to a link fromm to n as either an outward link fromm or an inward link to n. Assumption 3 reflects the ability
to carry out ‘‘link sensing’’, whereby each node can sense its inward links. In practice, this must be realized by some kind of
protocol, e.g., m must periodically announce its presence to n, or, in the bidirectional case, a handshake protocol initiated
by nmay be used. Note, that as a result, this assumption does not require that the receiver n immediately becomes aware
of changes, but only eventually.
Environment Assumption 4. Anodemmay send amessage to a node n onlywhen there exists a link fromm to n.Moreover,
the transmission occurs in a collision-free fashion.
Note that, in practice, collision-free communication may be realized in different ways. For example, using the CSMA/CD
‘‘backoff’’ approach in Ethernet or by choosing the time interval between two successive transmissions to be larger than the
propagation delay for communication along any link.
Environment Assumption 5. When a link goes down, any messages sent on it and not yet received are lost.
This reflects that there is a delay (of unbounded length) betweenmessage transmission and reception, andmessages can be
lost during this time interval.
In the next section, we shall see how each of these requirements is formalized in the context of our Event-B development.
4. Formal development
Here we describe our development of topology discovery in Event-B. The approach that we take, which is general to
system development by refinement, is to build a series of models, where each model refines the model preceding it.
4.1. Refinement strategy
The initialmodels incrementally introduce our assumptions on the environment and the system,whereas the subsequent
models introduce design decisions for the resulting system. Below we provide an overview of the series of models that we
constructed.
Initial model specifies the protocol environment.
Refinement 1 introduces the observer event for observing stable states and adds systemevents tomodel hownodes update
their link information.
Refinement 2 provides further details about link updates, in particular how a node updates information about its direct
links or receives information about links from its neighbor nodes.
Refinement 3 introduces sequence numbers for tracking fresh link-state information.
Refinement 4 uses message passing to transmit information about the status of links.
Refinement 5 separates the events into two sets: the set of events that update link-state information and those events that
discard it as being redundant; the idea is to prove the convergence of the events that update link-state information.
Refinements 6 completes the convergence proof.
In the rest of this section, we explain these models in more detail and present representative parts of our formalization.
Note that the entire development (all proof obligations and theorems) has been proved using the Rodin tool. The entire
machine-checked development archive can be found on the web.2
4.2. The context and initial model
We begin by defining an Event-B context. In the context, we define the carrier set NODES of all network nodes and we
axiomatize that it is finite. This formalizes Environment Assumption 1. Additionally, we define a (function) constant closure
that, together with axioms, formalizes the transitive closure of binary relations between NODES.
sets: NODES constants: closure
axioms:
axm0_1 finite(NODES)
axm0_2 closure ∈ (NODES↔ NODES)→ (NODES↔ NODES)
axm0_3 ∀r · r ⊆ closure(r)
axm0_4 ∀r · closure(r); r ⊆ closure(r)
axm0_5 ∀r, s · r ⊆ s ∧ s; r ⊆ s ⇒ closure(r) ⊆ s
Note that ‘‘;’’ denotes forward relational composition.
2 URL: http://deploy-eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/31/.
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In our initial model, we formalize the behavior of the environment, where links (represented as pairs of nodes) may go
up or down at any time. The variable RLinks (R for real, i.e., actual links) represents the set of links that are currently up,
whereas the variable DLinks represents the set of links that are down. These sets are disjoint (inv0_3) since a link cannot
be simultaneously up and down. Note, however that we do not require that their union is the set of all links. This may
be because two nodes are simply not communication neighbors or because their status has not yet been fixed. This set of
‘‘unknown’’ links is simply the complement of the set RLinks ∪ DLinks. The sets RLinks and DLinks are initially both empty.
In our model, we also use two auxiliary variables to track the history of the links: RLinksH (H for history) represents the
set of links that are up or were up. Similarly, DLinksH represents the set of links that are down or were down. These are each
initially assigned the empty set. The invariants inv0_4–inv0_7 formalize the relationships between the actual links and the
history links.
inv0_4–inv0_5: The history should not be too small, i.e., it should contain at least the current set of links.
inv0_6–inv0_7: The history should not be too large, i.e., it should not contain any unknown links.
The history variables RLinksH and DLinksH are fictional in the sense that the algorithm that we develop will not actually
make use of them. We will remove them from our model in a later refinement.
variables: RLinks,DLinks, RLinksH,DLinksH
invariants:
inv0_1 RLinks ∈ NODES↔ NODES
inv0_2 DLinks ∈ NODES↔ NODES
inv0_3 RLinks ∩ DLinks = ∅
inv0_4 RLinks ⊆ RLinksH
inv0_5 DLinks ⊆ DLinksH
inv0_6 RLinksH ⊆ RLinks ∪ DLinks
inv0_7 DLinksH ⊆ RLinks ∪ DLinks
init
begin
RLinks,DLinks := ∅,∅
RLinksH,DLinksH := ∅,∅
end
Beside initialization, there are two additional events: AddLink and RemoveLink. The first models the case where an arbitrary
link (that is not currently up) comes up. This link is then added to the set RLinks and RLinksH and removed from the set
DLinks (if it is already there). The second handles the symmetric case.
AddLink
any link where
link /∈ RLinks
then
RLinks := RLinks ∪ {link}
DLinks := DLinks \ {link}
RLinksH := RLinks ∪ {link}
end
RemoveLink
any link where
link /∈ DLinks
then
RLinks := RLinks \ {link}
DLinks := DLinks ∪ {link}
DLinksH := DLinksH ∪ {link}
end
Note that these events formalize Environment Assumption 2. The fact that communication links are directed is
formalized by the fact that the relations RLinks and DLinks are not necessarily symmetric.
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Fig. 3. Information propagation fromm to n.
4.3. The first refinement
In our first refinement, we start to model the details of the protocol, although still very abstractly. In particular, we state
that the link information stored at each of the nodes gets updated, although without yet specifying how.
We introduce two variables rlinks and dlinks with the following invariants. These two variables represent the current
link-state information stored by each node.
invariants:
inv1_1 rlinks ∈ NODES→ (NODES↔ NODES)
inv1_2 dlinks ∈ NODES→ (NODES↔ NODES)
inv1_3 ∀n · rlinks(n) ⊆ RLinksH
inv1_4 ∀n · dlinks(n) ⊆ DLinksH
inv1_5 ∀n · rlinks(n) ∩ dlinks(n) = ∅
The first two invariants specify that rlinks and dlinks are both total functions. This formalizes that each node stores its
own local information (a binary relation between NODES) about the status of links. Invariants inv1_3 and inv1_4 directly
establish System Requirement 2: if a node has some information that a link is up, then this link must be either currently up
or was up in the past, and similarly with information about down-links. The last invariant, inv1_5, states that a node cannot
store contradictory information about the same link. Of course, different nodes can have different information about the
same link.
One of the key aspects of our development strategy is specifying a so-called observer event. This event has no effect on
this system state itself as its action is skip. Rather, its guard is used to define the notion of a stable state of the system.
stabilize
status ordinary
when
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ RLinks⇔m 7→ n ∈ rlinks(n)
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ DLinks⇔m 7→ n ∈ dlinks(n)
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ closure(RLinks)⇒
(∀k · (k 7→ m ∈ rlinks(n)⇔ k 7→ m ∈ rlinks(m)) ∧
(k 7→ m ∈ dlinks(n)⇔ k 7→ m ∈ dlinks(m)))
then
skip
end
The three guards can be understood as follows.
• The first two guards hold in states where every node n knows the correct status of all its inward links. In other words, n
has detected all the changes in the environment with respect to its inward links. This detection is realized in subsequent
refinement levels through hello and goodbye events. Note thatm 7→ n is the Event-B notation for the pair (m, n).
• The last guard says that if there is a path from a node m to n, i.e., m 7→ n ∈ closure(RLinks), then n has the same
information (up/down) asm for all inward links tom. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Hence, the observer event fires in those states where nodes know the correct status of their neighbors and this status
has already been propagated through the network along all outward links. Intuitively, in stable states, all nodes have the
maximum knowledge of the environment that can be acquired from link sensing and communication along links. We will
say that the system is in a stable statewhen the observer event can fire.
A central property that we proved is the following.
Theorem 1 (Stability Implies Correct Local View). If the system is stable, then for any strongly connected component M in the
network and any node n in M, n has the correct view of the status (up/down) of all links in M.
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We formulate this theorem in Event-B as follows, where grdStabilize refers to the guard of the observer event.
grdStabilize
⇒
(∀M ·
(∀f , l · f ∈ M ∧ l ∈ M ∧ f 6= l⇒ f 7→ l ∈ closure(RLinks))
⇒
(∀n · n ∈ M⇒
M C rlinks(n) BM = M C RLinks BM ∧
M C dlinks(n) BM = M C DLinks BM))
Here, a set of nodesM defines a strongly connected component of the graph whose edge relation is defined by RLinks, when
for every distinct pair of nodes f and l in M , then f 7→ l ∈ closure(RLinks). The operators C and B respectively restrict the
domain and the range of a relation to a set (hereM , i.e., the vertices of the strongly connected component).
We proved this theorem using the Rodin tool. The theorem itself constitutes part of the proof of System Requirement 1.
Namely, in a stable state, each node has the correct view of all links in its strongly connected component. It still remains to
be proved that this stable state will be reached whenever the environment is inactive for a sufficiently long time period. We
prove this in Section 4.9.
In this model, we also introduce two new events, addlink and removelink, which modify the link-state information of
some node.
addlink
status anticipated
any n, link where
n ∈ NODES
link ∈ RLinksH
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) ∪ {link}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) \ {link}
end
removelink
status anticipated
any n, link where
n ∈ NODES
link ∈ DLinksH
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) \ {link}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) ∪ {link}
end
The event addlink abstractly models a node receiving information on a link directly from the topology. Specifically, the
event nondeterministically selects a node n and a link link which is currently up or was previously up. It then updates n’s
local information about link, ensuring that it is added to the set of real (up-)links and removed from the set of down-links.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the event may add a link to rlinks(n) that is actually down, i.e., that belongs to DLinks and only
was up in the past. This reflects a key aspect of our distributed algorithm: the information that nodes receive about the
environment may be outdated. But by the time n receives information that link is up, the link may actually be down.
The second event removelink is analogous to addlink. From now on, we concentrate on the refinement of addlink; the
refinement of removelink can be found in our on-line development archive.
Observe that since none of the three new events modifies the old variables RLinks, DLinks, RLinksH , and DLinksH , they all
constitute trivial refinements of skip. At this level of refinement, addlink and removelink are anticipated. That is, we delay
the proof that these events converge to subsequent refinements.
4.4. The second refinement
In this refinement, we specify more concretely how link information is updated in each node. There are two cases.
The first case models a direct update by the hello event.
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hello
refines addlink
status convergent
any n,m where
m 7→ n ∈ RLinks
m 7→ n /∈ rlinks(n)
with
link = m 7→ n
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) ∪ {m 7→ n}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) \ {m 7→ n}
end
This models the situation where a node n discovers information (by receiving a ‘‘hello’’ message) from a node m with an
outward link to n. As indicated by the refines keyword, this event refines the abstract event addlink, where the abstract
parameter link is represented by the pair m 7→ n. To see that this is a refinement, observe that the guard strengthening
(GRD) proof obligation holds since the guard of this event m 7→ n ∈ RLinks implies that m 7→ n ∈ RLinksH (recall the
invariant inv0_3, which states that RLinks ⊆ RLinksH). Moreover, the proof obligations (SIM) and (INV_REF) hold since the
updates of rlinks and dlinks are equal, with the witness link = m 7→ n.
The second case models an indirect update by the transfer_rlink event.
transfer_rlink
refines addlink
status anticipated
any n,m, x, y where
x 7→ y ∈ rlinks(m) ∪ dlinks(m)
n 6= y
x 7→ y ∈ RLinksH
with
link = x 7→ y
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) ∪ {x 7→ y}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) \ {x 7→ y}
end
This models a node n receiving information about a link x 7→ y from some nodem, which is not necessarily a neighbor. The
guard n 6= y indicates that this is an indirect update, that is, x 7→ y is not an inward link of n. This refines the abstract event
addlink, where the abstract parameter link is represented by the pair x 7→ y. The guard strengthening (GRD) is trivial since
we did not remove the abstract guard. The proof obligations (SIM) and (INV_REF) are trivially satisfied with link replaced
by x 7→ y (witness link = x 7→ y). Note that the third guard, which refers to RLinksH , cheats in the sense that it looks at
the history. This cheating will be eliminated in a later refinement step when this event is refined and the variable RLinksH
is removed.
The link-state information for down-links is modeled analogously by events goodbye and transfer_dlink, which are
omitted here. Together, hello and goodbye formalize Environment Assumption 3.
At this stage, we also prove the convergence of the hello and goodbye events and we will prove the convergence of
the transfer_rlink and transfer_dlink events in the next refinement. Hence, they are anticipated at this level. The reason for
decomposing the convergence proof into different refinements is that this allowsus to simplify the proof by decomposing the
events into two different subsets and then considering these subsets individually. Note that when proving the convergence,
we still have the obligation of proving that the anticipated events do not increase the new variant. Taken together, these
steps imply that the events reduce a composite variant, built from the lexicographic combination of the variants used in the
two proofs.
The variant that we used in this refinement is V1 defined by
{m 7→ n | m 7→ n ∈ RLinks \ rlinks(n)} ∪
{m 7→ n | m 7→ n ∈ DLinks \ dlinks(n)} .
This is the set of inward links to n, where n has incorrect information. Since the set of NODES is finite, this variant is also
finite. Informally, since the hello and goodbye events both provide correct information about one inward link of a node, they
therefore decrease the variant V1.
As noted above, even though we do not prove the convergence of the transfer_rlink and transfer_dlink events here, we
must prove that these events do not increase the variant V1. This is the case since these events do not change the status of
any inward link to a node (notice the guard n 6= y), so V1 will not be changed.
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4.5. The third refinement
In the following refinement steps, we model communication between nodes. This is in contrast to the last step where
nodes update their link information directly using the link information of other nodes, which is of course not realizable
in a distributed system. Before modeling communication, we first model how nodes track which information is fresh, i.e.,
whether the link information received is new or old.
In this model, we introduce a new variable, seqNum, representing the sequence number stored at each node for each link.
invariants:
inv3_1 seqNum ∈ NODES→ (NODES× NODES→ N)
inv3_2 ∀k,m, n · seqNum(k)(m 7→ n) ≤ seqNum(n)(m 7→ n)
inv3_3 ∀m, n, link ·
seqNum(m)(link) = seqNum(n)(link) ∧ link ∈ rlinks(m)
⇒ link ∈ rlinks(n)
inv3_4 ∀m, n, link ·
seqNum(m)(link) = seqNum(n)(link) ∧ link ∈ dlinks(m)
⇒ link ∈ dlinks(n)
inv3_5 ∀n, link · 0 < seqNum(n)(link)⇒ link ∈ rlinks(n) ∪ dlinks(n)
inv3_6 ∀n, link · link ∈ rlinks(n) ∪ dlinks(n)⇒ 0 < seqNum(n)(link)
The events that we will give preserve the following invariants:
inv3_1: Each node stores its own sequence number information about the links. This is represented as a table of non-
negative numbers, with an entry for each link. The entry 0 signifies that the node does not currently have any
information about the given link.
inv3_2: The sequence number n has about a linkm 7→ n is always the most recent.
inv3_3–inv3_4: If two nodesm and n have the same sequence number for a given link, then they also have the same link-
state information for that link.
inv3_5–inv3_6: For any node n, possessing information about a given link is equivalent to having a positive sequence
number for link.
Moreover, in order to reason about the convergence of transfer_rlink and transfer_dlink, we introduce an auxiliary variable
msg that ‘‘measures’’ the convergence of the event. This variable will not be used in the guards of the events. Hence it does
not affect the execution and we can therefore safely remove this variable in the subsequent refinement. The invariants
concerningmsg are as follows.
invariants:
inv3_7 msg ∈ (NODES× NODES× N)↔ NODES
inv3_8 ∀x, y, sn, n ·
sn ≤ seqNum(y)(x 7→ y) ∧
seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) < sn
⇒
x 7→ y 7→ sn 7→ n ∈ msg
inv3_9 finite(msg)
inv3_7: Each message contains information in the form of a link and sequence number as well as the destination node for
the information.
inv3_8: If n’s sequence number for a link x 7→ y is less than y’s, then the information about x 7→ y from y has not yet
reached n.
inv3_9: msg is finite.
In the initialization event, the sequence number for all links is set to 0 andmsg is empty.
seqNum := NODES × {(NODES × NODES)× {0}}
msg := ∅
The sequence number for a given node and link first takes on a positive value after a direct update (e.g. in the hello event).
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hello
refines hello
any n,m where
m 7→ n ∈ RLinks
m 7→ n /∈ rlinks(n)
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) ∪ {m 7→ n}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) \ {m 7→ n}
seqNum(n)(m 7→ n) := seqNum(n)(m 7→ n)+ 1
msg := msg ∪
({m 7→ n 7→ seqNum(n)(m 7→ n)+ 1} × (NODES \ {n}))
end
The only differencewith the abstract version is the last two assignments, which increment the sequence number and update
msg .3 Since the event’s guard is unchanged and the additional assignment modifies only a new variable, this clearly refines
the corresponding abstract hello event. Once new information is detected by n, this information must be propagated to all
the other nodes in the network.
For indirect updates, the sequence number for the link-state information being transferred is not updated, but simply
passed from one node to another.
transfer_rlink
refines transfer_rlink
status convergent
any n,m, x, y, sn where
m 7→ n ∈ RLinks
sn ≤ seqNum(m)(x 7→ y)
seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) < sn
∀k · seqNum(k)(x 7→ y) = sn⇒ x 7→ y ∈ rlinks(k)
x 7→ y ∈ RLinksH
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) ∪ {x 7→ y}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) \ {x 7→ y}
seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) := sn
msg := msg \ {x 7→ y 7→ sn 7→ n}
end
Compared to the abstract version of the event, there is an additional parameter sn. This parameter represents the sequence
number that m stored for the link x 7→ y when the message was sent. This is less than or equal to the current sequence
number thatm has for this link, since the sequence number that a node associates with a link never decreases (it is strictly
less if m has received new information on this link in the meantime). The fourth guard states that for any node k with
the same sequence number for the link x 7→ y, the link is in the set of k’s up-links. This ensures that there will be no
conflicting information in the network. Note that both the second and fourth guards (togetherwith the last guard, introduced
previously) cheat in the sense that they cannot be directly implemented. This cheating will be eliminated in a subsequent
refinement. The additional assignments in the event’s action, with respect to the abstract version, update n’s sequence
number for the link x 7→ y and remove this information from the setmsg .
We establish guard strengthening (GRD) as follows. From the event’s guard, we can derive that seqNum(m)(x 7→ y) is
positive. Together with the invariant inv3_5, this implies that x 7→ y ∈ rlinks(m) ∪ dlinks(m) (i.e.m has previously received
information about the link x 7→ y). We now prove n 6= y by contradiction. From the second and third guards of the event,
we derive that seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) < seqNum(m)(x 7→ y) and by replacing y with n, we have seqNum(n)(x 7→ n) <
seqNum(m)(x 7→ n). However, from invariant inv3_2, seqNum(m)(x 7→ n) ≤ seqNum(n)(x 7→ n), which is a contradiction.
The third abstract guard, i.e., x 7→ y ∈ RLinksH , is copied here. For the proof obligations (SIM) and (INV_REF), the only
additional assignments are to update the sequence number andmsg . Hence these obligations are trivially satisfied.
In this refinement, we also proved the convergence of the transfer_rlink and transfer_dlink events. The variant V2 is just
msg . First, by inv3_9, the variant is finite. Second, the action of these two transfer events removes x 7→ y 7→ sn 7→ n from
msg . Finally, from the invariant inv3_8 and the guard of this event, x 7→ y 7→ sn 7→ n ∈ msg . Hence these events decrease
the variant V2.
3 The notation f (x) := E denotes the update f := f C− {x 7→ E}, where C− is the operator for relational override. Note, in the third assignment, that
seqNum(n) is a function and therefore seqNum(n)(m 7→ n) denotes the one-point update of this function at the pointm 7→ n.
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The variants V1 and V2 form a lexicographical variant, namely V = (V2, V1) where V2 has higher precedence. The
convergence proofs that we gave in the current and the last refinement show that the events hello, goodbye, transfer_rlink,
and transfer_dlink decrease the combined variant V .
The guard of the observer event stabilize is also refined using information about sequence numbers. In particular, the
abstract event
stabilize
when
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ RLinks⇔m 7→ n ∈ rlinks(n)
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ DLinks⇔m 7→ n ∈ dlinks(n)
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ closure(RLinks)⇒
(∀k · (k 7→ m ∈ rlinks(n)⇔ k 7→ m ∈ rlinks(m)) ∧
(k 7→ m ∈ dlinks(n)⇔ k 7→ m ∈ dlinks(m)))
then
skip
end
becomes
stabilize
when
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ RLinks⇔m 7→ n ∈ rlinks(n)
∀m, n ·m 7→ n ∈ DLinks⇔m 7→ n ∈ dlinks(n)
∀m, n, link ·m 7→ n ∈ RLinks⇒
seqNum(m)(link) ≤ seqNum(n)(link)
then
skip
end
The first two guards are unchanged and state that every node knows the status of all inward links. What is new is the
last guard. This states that for any pair of nodes m and n, and link link, if m has a direct communication link to n, then n’s
information about link is not older thanm’s. From the properties of closure and invariant inv3_2, it follows that if there is a
path fromm to n, then nwill have the same sequence number for all links inward tom. This fact, together with the invariants
inv3_3 and inv3_4, allows us to conclude that nwill have up-to-date information about all inward links tom (which is the
last abstract guard).
4.6. The fourth refinement
Wenowmodel communication.We first remove the auxiliary variablemsg .We also remove the assignments thatmodify
msg from the events hello and goodbye. We then introduce three variables: SChan, RChan, and DChan. These model the
channels for transmitting sequence numbers, up-link information, and down-link information, respectively.
invariants:
inv4_1 SChan ∈ (NODES× NODES)→ ((NODES× NODES)→ N)
inv4_2 RChan ∈ (NODES× NODES)→ (NODES↔ NODES)
inv4_3 DChan ∈ (NODES× NODES)→ (NODES↔ NODES)
For each pair of nodes, the link-state (up/down) information is a relation between NODES, formalizing the set of pairs of
nodes on the communication channel. More precisely, for all nodes m and n, RChan(m 7→ n) (resp. DChan(m 7→ n)) is
the set of up-link (down-link) information items that is transferred from m to n. The channel SChan associates sequence
numbers to the links in the link-state channels. Thus SChan(m 7→ n) stores information about the sequence numbers that
are in transit fromm to n.
We now mention the relevant channel properties.
invariants:
inv4_4 ∀m, n · RChan(m 7→ n) ∩ DChan(m 7→ n) = ∅
inv4_5 ∀m, n · (∃link · 0 < SChan(m 7→ n)(link))⇒m 7→ n ∈ RLinks
inv4_6 ∀m, n, link · SChan(m 7→ n)(link) ≤ seqNum(m)(link)
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inv4_4: Link-state channels from nodesm to n are disjoint.
inv4_5: If there is traffic (i.e., a link with a positive sequence number) in the channel from m to n, then the link m 7→ n
must currently be up.
inv4_6: For any two nodes m and n and a link, link’s sequence number in the channel from m to n is not newer than the
sequence number stored at nodem for the same link.
invariants:
inv4_7 ∀m, n, link · link ∈ RChan(m 7→ n)⇒
(∀k · seqNum(k)(link) = SChan(m 7→ n)(link)⇒
link ∈ rlinks(k))
inv4_8 ∀m, n, link · link ∈ DChan(m 7→ n)⇒
(∀k · seqNum(k)(link) = SChan(m 7→ n)(link)⇒
link ∈ dlinks(k))
inv4_9 ∀k, link · link ∈ rlinks(k)⇒
(∀m, n · seqNum(k)(link) = SChan(m 7→ n)(link)
⇒ link ∈ RChan(m 7→ n))
inv4_7 – inv4_9: The sequence numbers in the channels are consistent with the sequence numbers stored at each node.
For example, inv4_7 states that if a link is in the channel for up-links from m to n, then for any node k which has
the same sequence number as that stored in channel fromm to n, linkmust be in the set of up-links of the node k.
Note that the statement corresponding to inv4_9 for down-links, i.e.
∀k, link · link ∈ dlinks(k)⇒
(∀m, n · seqNum(k)(link) = SChan(m 7→ n)(link)
⇒ link ∈ DChan(m 7→ n)) ,
is derivable from the set of invariants.
invariants:
inv4_10 ∀m, n, x, y, link ·
SChan(m 7→ n)(link) = SChan(x 7→ y)(link) ∧
link ∈ RChan(m 7→ n)
⇒
link ∈ RChan(x 7→ y)
inv4_11 ∀m, n, link · link ∈ RChan(m 7→ n)⇒
0 < SChan(m 7→ n)(link)
inv4_12 ∀m, n, link · link ∈ DChan(m 7→ n)⇒
0 < SChan(m 7→ n)(link)
inv4_13 ∀m, n, link · link /∈ RChan(m 7→ n) ∧ link /∈ DChan(m 7→ n)
⇒ SChan(m 7→ n)(link) = 0
inv4_10: The sequence numbers in the channels are consistentwith each other. For example, if a linkhas the same sequence
number in the channel fromm to n and the channel from x to y, then this link either belongs to the up channels of
bothm 7→ n and x 7→ y, or the down channels of both, but not up for one and down for the other.
inv4_11 – inv4_13: For each pair of nodes m and n and the link link, if link is in one of the link-state channels, then the
sequence number for link in SChan is also positive and vice versa.
Moreover, at this stage, we can remove the history variables RLinksH and DLinksH . To prove refinement, we need the
following invariants, which relate these history variables to the information in the channels.
invariants:
inv4_14 ∀m, n·RChan(m 7→ n) ⊆ RLinksH
inv4_15 ∀m, n·DChan(m 7→ n) ⊆ DLinksH
inv4_14 – inv4_15: For each pair of nodes m and n, the up-link information in the channel from m to n is included in
RLinksH , the set of links that are up or were up. The invariant for down-links is analogous.
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Coming back to the modeling of the events, the actual communication between nodes uses the above channels, so the
abstract events for transferring link information (namely, transfer_rlink and transfer_dlink) must each be split into a pair of
events for sending and receiving information. The following diagram illustrates what happens. First, the node m sends the
information to the channels and afterwards the node n receives information from the channels. In our development, each
transfer event is refined by a receive event and we add a new send event, which therefore refines skip. In our diagram, the
top part is the abstraction (skip and transfer) and the bottom part is the refinement (send and receive).
mGFED@ABC nGFED@ABC
mGFED@ABC nGFED@ABCchannelsskip / transfer /send / receive /
Below is the description of the new event for sending information about an up-link fromm to n.
send_rlink
status anticipated
any m, n, link where
m 7→ n ∈ RLinks
SChan(m 7→ n)(link) = 0
link ∈ rlinks(m)
then
SChan(m 7→ n)(link) := seqNum(m)(link)
RChan(m 7→ n) := RChan(m 7→ n) ∪ {link}
end
For a node to send information about a link, this event assumes that the information about the same link from the last send
has been received or lost; see Environment Assumption 4. This is formalized by the guard stating that the corresponding
sequence number in the channel is 0. The information is then sent by placing it on the outward links fromm to n. The guard
m 7→ n ∈ RLinks (i.e. the link fromm to n is currently up), which is also required by Environment Assumption 4.
The abstract transfer_rlink is refined to specify the following event receive_rlink.
receive_rlink
refines transfer_rlink
any m, n, x, y where
seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) < SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y)
x 7→ y ∈ RChan(m 7→ n)
with
sn = SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y)
then
rlinks(n) := rlinks(n) ∪ {x 7→ y}
dlinks(n) := dlinks(n) \ {x 7→ y}
seqNum(n)(m 7→ n) := SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y)
SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y) := 0
RChan(m 7→ n) := RChan(m 7→ n) \ {x 7→ y}
end
The link-state information is retrieved from the channels from m to n. Here, the abstract parameter sn is refined as
SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y). Note that the proof obligations (SIM) and (INV_REF) are trivially satisfied since the additional
actions only modify new variables, namely SChan and RChan. To establish guard strengthening (GRD), we must prove the
following.
• m 7→ n is an up-link. But, since seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) < SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y), we know that SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y) is
positive. From the invariant inv4_5, we can conclude that the linkm 7→ n is an up-link.
• SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y) (as a witness of the abstract parameter sn) satisfies the guard of the abstract event, i.e.
SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y) ≤ seqNum(m)(x 7→ y)
seqNum(n)(x 7→ y) < SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y)
∀k · seqNum(k)(x 7→ y) = SChan(m 7→ n)(x 7→ y)⇒ x 7→ y ∈ rlinks(k)
The first condition follows from the invariant inv4_6. The second condition is exactly the first guard of this concrete
event. The last condition can be derived from the second guard, x 7→ y ∈ RChan(m 7→ n), and the invariant inv4_7.
• x 7→ y ∈ RLinksH . But we know that x 7→ y ∈ RChan(m 7→ n) and from invariant inv4_14, we have that RChan(m 7→ n)
⊆ RLinksH and hence x 7→ y ∈ RLinksH .
The refinement of transfer_dlink to receive_dlink is analogous.
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Note that the event receive_rlink receives only genuinely newmessages. Hence it is necessary to introduce a complement
event that discards obsolete information, both for up-links and down-links. Another reason for introducing discard events
is that, without them, we would not be able to prove deadlock freedom in the next refinement level. Below is the event for
discarding information about an up-link (the new event discard_dlink is analogous).
discard_rlink
status anticipated
any m, n, link where
SChan(m 7→ n)(link) ≤ seqNum(n)(link)
link ∈ RChan(m 7→ n)
then
SChan(m 7→ n)(link) := 0
RChan(m 7→ n) := RChan(m 7→ n) \ {link}
end
The link-state information is obsolete since the node has already receivedmore recent information about link in the channel.
Hence, the information is simply discarded from the channel. This new event refines skip since the actions only effect the
new variables, SChan and RChan.
Now that we have explicitly introduced communication, we refine the environment event RemoveLink to account for
Environment Assumption 5. That is, when a link goes down, any messages sent on it and not yet received are lost.
RemoveLink
refines RemoveLink
any link where
link ∈ RLinks
then
RLinks := RLinks \ {link}
DLinks := DLinks ∪ {link}
SChan := SChan C− ({link} × {NODES× NODES× {0}})
RChan(link) := ∅
DChan(link) := ∅
end
This trivially refines the abstract RemoveLink event since the guard is unchanged and the new assignments onlymodify new
variables.
Note that at this point all the events can be straightforwardly implemented in a distributed system. That is, the events
no longer ‘‘cheat’’ and perform tests or actions that would not be algorithmically realizable.
4.7. The fifth refinement
Our machine in the fourth refinement is an implementation of the protocol. However, we have not yet established the
convergence of the events send_rlink and discard_rlink (and correspondingly for dlink). We are now faced with the following
problem: these events actually do not converge and should not converge. As we saw in Fig. 1 (third part), each node will
periodically broadcast information about its LSDB and its neighbors will repeatedly receive this information, even when it
is not new. What we will show then is that the system eventually does reach a stable state (assuming that the environment
does not change), i.e. the system satisfies SystemRequirement 1, despite continually broadcasting and receiving redundant
information.
To prove this, we construct an equivalentmodel of the systemby first partitioning these four non-convergent events each
into two parts: a convergent part and a divergent part. We accomplish this by defining a restricted local notion of stability,
called neighbor stability, and showing that the neighbor-stable parts diverge and, conversely, the neighbor-unstable parts
converge. This is done in this section and Section 4.8. Afterwards, in Section 4.9, we prove that stability follows from this
partial convergence, under an additional assumption concerning the strong-fairness of event execution.
Given a link link and a link from m to n, we say the information about link is neighbor stable from m to n if n’s sequence
number for link is at least as large asm’s. This means that the information about link inm does not need to be propagated to
n and therefore further information coming fromm about linkwill not change this neighbor-stable status. Using this notion
of being neighbor stable, we can restate the third guard of the observe event stabilize (from Section 4.5) as follows: Any link
is neighbor stable for any up-link fromm to n.
We now partition the events by adding either the guard
seqNum(m)(link) ≤ seqNum(n)(link)
896 T.S. Hoang et al. / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2009) 879–899
or its complement. For example, we partition the send_rlink event into the two events, send_rlink_stable and send_rlink_
unstable. For send_rlink_stablewe add the above guard and for send_rlink_unstablewe add the complement as a guard. We
partition the other three events discard_rlink, send_dlink, and discard_dlink similarly.
Note that we must partition the discard events as information must also be discarded in neighbor-unstable states. The
reason for this is that communication is asynchronous and therefore information may be sent in a stable state but received
in an unstable state.
To prove that the events send_rlink_unstable and send_dlink_unstable are convergent, we use the following variant V3.
{m 7→ n 7→ link | SChan(m 7→ n)(link) ≤ seqNum(n)(link)}
This denotes the set of old messages on all channels. We will prove the convergence of discard_rlink_unstable and
discard_dlink_unstable in the next refinement level and hence they act as anticipated events here.
The convergence proof is as follows. First, note that all these events transfer link’s sequence number fromm to n. For any
tuple x 7→ y 7→ k different fromm 7→ n 7→ link, the events change neither SChan(x 7→ y)(k) nor seqNum(y)(k). Hence, we
can restrict our attention tom 7→ n 7→ link. Now consider the following cases.
• For the events send_rlink_unstable and send_dlink_unstable, their guards state that the sequence number for link in the
channel from m to n is 0 and hence m 7→ n 7→ link ∈ V3. After the event, the sequence number for link in m, which is
newer than n’s sequence number for link, is copied to the channel. Hence m 7→ n 7→ link /∈ V ′3 (V ′3 denotes the value of
the variant after the event execution) and therefore V3 is decreased.
• For the events send_rlink_stable and sen_dlink_stable, their guards state that the sequence number in the channel is 0.
Hence m 7→ n 7→ link ∈ V3. After the event, the information from m that is not newer than that of n is copied to the
channel. Hencem 7→ n 7→ link ∈ V ′3. This means that V3 does not increase.• For discard_rlink_stable, discard_rlink_unstable, discard_dlink_stable, and discard_dlink_unstable, the guards of these
events state that the information in the channel before is not newer than that of n and afterwards this information is
reset to 0, which is also not newer than that of n. Hence V3 also does not increase.
In this refinement step, we also proved the following theorem about the deadlock freeness of a set of events. Namely,
the guard of the event stabilize is equivalent to the negation of the disjunction of the guards of the following eight
events: hello, goodbye, send_rlink_unstable, send_dlink_unstable, receive_rlink, discard_rlink_unstable, receive_dlink, and
discard_dlink_unstable. Hence, if none of these eight events is enabled, then stabilize is enabled and the system is therefore
in a stable state.
Moreover, we also proved theorems stating that the four events send_rlink_stable, send_dlink_stable, discard_rlink_stable,
and discard_dlink_stablemaintain the system’s stable state, that is, if the state before the event execution is stable then the
state after the event execution is also stable. This is easy to prove since stable refers only to RLinks, DLinks, rlinks, dlinks, and
seqNum, whereas our four events only modify the information in the channels, i.e., SChan, RChan, and DChan. Hence, these
events will maintain the stable state.
4.8. Sixth refinement
In this refinement step, we prove the convergence of the discard_rlink_unstable and discard_dlink_unstable. The variant
V4 that we used is
{m 7→ n 7→ link | SChan(m 7→ n)(link) 6= 0} ∩
{m 7→ n 7→ link | seqNum(n)(link) < seqNum(m)(link)} .
Informally, the variant represents the set of messages about link that are transferred fromm to n, where link is not neighbor
stable fromm to n. The proof is as follows.
• The events discard_rlink_unstable and discard_dlink_unstable discard a message for a link from m to n where the
information is unstable. Hence they decrease the variant V4.
• The events discard_rlink_stable and discard_dlink_stable also discard amessage for a link fromm to n, but the information
is stable. Hence they do not increase the variant V4.
4.9. Partial convergence implies stability
In contrast to the case for the development of terminating programs, we now only prove the convergence of a subset of
the events. Nevertheless, this is sufficient to establish System Requirement 1. Namely, if the environment is inactive for a
sufficiently long time, then for each strongly connected component M , the local view of every node in M agrees with the
actual topology, restricted toM .
First, we introduce the notion of a run of Event-B together with a strong-fairness assumption. A run of an Event-B model
is an infinite sequence of states obtained from an initial state by executing events of the model. We call a run strongly fair
with respect to a set of events E if it respects the following strong-fairness assumption with respect to E: if an event from E is
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enabled infinitely often, then it will be taken infinitely often. This assumption will hold for any reasonable implementation
of topology discovery.
At the last refinement level, the set of events can be divided into different groups as follows.
1. A set of environment events Env = {Env1, . . ., Envl}. In our case, there are just the two events AddLink and RemoveLink.
2. An observer event Obs. This observer event has skip as its action and its guard specified that the system is in a stable
state. Hence it is of the form
when stable then skip end
In our development, this is the stabilize event.
3. A set of convergent events CE = {CE1, . . ., CEm}. In our development, the convergent events are hello, goodbye, send_rlink_
unstable, send_dlink_unstable, receive_rlink, discard_rlink_unstable, receive_dlink, and discard_dlink_unstable.
4. A set of divergent events DE = {DE1, . . ., DEn}. These events are send_rlink_stable, send_dlink_stable, discard_rlink_stable,
and discard_dlink_stable.
We will now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (System Stabilizes). Assume that the following propositions hold:
(i) Deadlock freedom for the observer event Obs and convergent events CE. In particular,
stable⇔¬(G(CE1) ∨ · · · ∨ G(CEm)) ,
where G(CEi) is the guard of the event Ci.
(ii) The events in CE converge using a well-founded variant V .
(iii) The events in DE do not increase V .
(iv) The events in DE preserve stable. By this we mean that none of the DE events disable the guard of Obs.
(v) The events in CE are strongly fair.
Then if the environment is eventually quiescent (i.e., at some point no environment events Env1, . . ., Envl from the first group
occur) then the system will eventually reach a stable state and remain in this state.
The following proof is a traditional ‘‘paper and pencil proof’’, rather than a proof using the Rodin tool.
Proof. Our proof of Theorem 2 is by contradiction and proceeds as follows. Assume that there is a strongly fair run R with a
quiescent suffix, but which never reaches a stable state. Then there must be infinitely many i such that R(i) does not satisfy
‘‘stable’’. Let r be a quiescent suffix of R. By Proposition (i), there are infinitely many states such that some event in CE is
enabled. By the fairness assumption, Proposition (v), the events in CE must be taken infinitely often on r . Since there are no
environment events and by Proposition (ii) all events in CE decrease the variant, whereas by Proposition (iii), other system
events (i.e., Obs and DE) do not increase the variant V , the variant V is decreased infinitely often in r . This contradicts the
well-foundedness of V . Therefore, all strongly fair runs with a quiescent suffix eventually reach a stable state. Moreover,
once in a stable state, all the events in CE are disabled and, by Proposition (iv), the events in DE preserve the stable state.
Combining this with the fact that event Obs does not change the state (its action is skip), it follows that the system stays in
the stable state. 
Note that the theorem statement is closely related to the proof rules for extended response ofManna and Pnueli [19]. Our
statement is somewhat simpler than their rules as we deal only with assertional (state) formulas and strongly fair events
(they consider both weakly and strongly fair transitions). Moreover, we have an additional assumption (iv), which we use
to establish that stability is preserved after a stable state is reached.
In our application of this theorem, we assume Proposition (v), whereas the other propositions have already been
previously proved using the Rodin tool. In particular, we proved Propositions (i) and (iv) in the fifth refinement and
Propositions (ii) and (iii) in the second, third, fifth, and sixth refinements. The system referred to in the theorem statement
is the machine M5 given by the fifth refinement, rather than the machine M4 from the fourth refinement, which is our
implementation. However,M5 simply partitions four ofM4’s events. Therefore the proof of Theorem2 forM5 can be naturally
mapped to M4. Namely, the partition of M4’s events into stable and unstable events in M5 gives rise to a partition of their
instances (recall Section 2.1). Therefore Theorem 2 also holds forM4 if we restate the fairness assumption in Theorem 2 as
follows: ‘‘If an instance of an event is enabled infinitely often, then it will be taken infinitely often.’’
Finally, recall Theorem 1, proved in Section 4.3, which states that in a stable state, each node has the correct view of
all links in its strongly connected component. It follows from this and Theorem 2 that the system M4 satisfies System
Requirement 1.
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Table 1
Proof statistics.
Model Number of Automatically Interactively
proof obligations discharged discharged
Context 0 0 0
Initial model 21 19 (91%) 2 (9%)
1st refinement 33 30 (91%) 3 (9%)
2nd refinement 30 25 (83%) 5 (17%)
3rd refinement 74 38 (54%) 36 (46%)
4th refinement 176 102 (58%) 74 (42%)
5th refinement 44 7 (16%) 37 (84%)
6th refinement 8 0 (0%) 8 (100%)
Total 386 221 (57%) 165 (43%)
4.10. Summary — proof statistics
In Table 1we give proof statistics of the development in the Rodin tool. These statisticsmeasure the size of themodel, the
proof obligations generated and discharged by the Rodin tool, and those proved interactively. Note that there aremany proof
obligations in the fourth refinement due to the introduction of three different channels. In order to guarantee correctness
using these channels, various invariants must be established. Moreover, our formal model of these channels uses high-order
functions. Given the current state of the Rodin tool, this results in a large number of interactive (manual) proofs. Also,most of
the proofs in the fifth and the sixth refinements are interactively discharged. Themain reason for this is the lack of automatic
support in the tool for reasoning about set comprehension, disjunctions, and strict subsets.
5. Related work and conclusions
5.1. Related work
Numerous formal methods have been applied to the analysis of network protocols. This includes model checking [7,16],
theorem proving [12], and development by refinement [4,25]. Most of the existing case studies focus on endpoint protocols,
such as link-layer protocols like the sliding-window or alternating-bit protocols, or higher-level protocols such as SSL/TLS.
These protocols generally involve just two processes (the endpoints) or perhaps a third process (e.g., an adversary). Routing
is different as its specification should make a general statement about an entire networks of nodes, executing the protocol
concurrently.
With respect to routing protocols, probably themost detailed study is that of [9], who used an interactive theoremprover
(HOL) together with a model checker (SPIN) to prove different properties of distance vector routing protocols. They carried
out case studies analyzing the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) standard and the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) protocol. Although the protocols that they analyze are of a different flavor than ours (distance vector versus link
state) there are a number of similarities. For instance, in their analysis of RIP, they formalize a notion of stability, which
captures nodes agreeing on shortest paths. They are able to establish this property in general, since the protocol imposes
limits on the lengths of paths (so-called hop counts). In contrast, we can only show (our notion of) the stability of topology
discovery under the assumption of a suitably quiescent environment. Another substantial difference is that they carry out
post-hoc protocol verification whereas we focus on protocol development.
In [23], the authors describes their use of CMC, a code-based model checker for C and C++, to model check different
implementations of AODV. They use model checking not for verification, but rather for bug finding and hence they can
soundly reduce the protocol’s infinite state space (unbounded number of nodes, unbounded sequence counters, etc.) to a
finite one by scaling down their model to work with a fixed number (2 to 4) of processes that operate on data from finite
domains. The properties checked include properties of the distributed routing tables (which was also the case in [9]), such
as the routing tables of all nodes not forming a loop. In addition, since they are working with a code-based checker, they
are able to search for implementation errors, such as segmentation violations, memory leaks, dangling pointers, and the
like. These implementation aspects are, of course, not present in our work, although it is possible in theory to carry out the
refinement down to actual code, which is then, by construction, error free. The Rodin tool does not yet, however, support
this.
A number of network protocols have been formally developed using refinement. For example, [25] shows how to develop
a family of different sliding-window protocols. These are two-party endpoint protocols that provide reliable data transfer
between a producer and a consumer connected by unreliable channels. An example of non-endpoint protocol is given in [4],
which presents the development of a distributed leader election protocol on a connected network graph (the IEEE 1394
protocol). [2] presents the development in Event-B of a routing algorithm formobile agents due to [20], whichwas originally
verified in Coq.
Finally, note that the main system property that we show (System Requirement 1) is established by proving that the
system enters a stable state. The notion of stability that we formalize in Section 4.3 is an instance of the general notion of a
stable system property (see, e.g., [14,18]), which is a property P of system states whereby if P is true of any reachable state
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s, then P is true of all states reachable from s. Different approaches have been given for proving stabilization properties of
protocols, e.g., [15,27]. Our Theorem 2 gives sufficient conditions for establishing (a form of) stability. It is attractive in that,
with the exception of the fairness assumption, all other assumptions can directly and easily be established with the Rodin
tool.
5.2. Conclusions
We have presented a case study in formally developing a distributed topology discovery algorithm in Event-B. Our
approach to formalizing and reasoning about stable states should be applicable to other semi-reactive systems, including
other routing algorithms. Our approach is particularly novel in how it combines refinement with arguments about
convergence and disjointness of events to specify liveness properties about the system eventually stabilizing and properties
of the resulting stable state.
We have presented a single development of topology discovery. However, in actuality, we formalized several different
developments, each highlighting a different aspect of the problem, making different assumptions about the environment,
and establishing different properties. For example, we first considered the case where the environment is static and we
developed a terminating algorithm satisfying a strong post-condition. We also considered the case where the environment
is dynamic and not necessarily stabilizing. There we had the idea of augmenting the environment with history variables and
using them to establish interesting, although weak invariants, e.g., corresponding to our second requirement. The current
development, and our general development approach, arose from different attempts to combine these developments and
exploit the standard notions of convergence and deadlock freeness as a way to express properties holding only in stable
states. Our different developments reflect not only themany facets of the problem, but also the fact that therewas a learning
process involved in understanding the problem, the solution, and the invariants that hold. The observation that specifying
problems is often nontrivial and requires iteration to converge on a good solution (and there may be many) is certainly not
new. But it is an observation worth repeating and such iteration fits well in a development process where one alternates
between specification and proving at different levels of abstraction.
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